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Abstract 
This article focuses on the Canadian labour movement's experience with 
constitutional reform in the early 1980s. Specifically, it argues that political 
divisions within the labour movement and the New Democratic Party (NDP) 
convinced the leadership of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) to exclude 
itself from the process ofpatriating the Constitution. Several scholars have 
previously argued that the CLC was either unaware of or genuinely 
disinterested in constitutional issues. However, primary sources strongly 
indicate that these explanations are simply insufficient. Although it is 
accurate to suggest that the CLC was not an active participant in the process 
of constitutional reform, inactivity should not be confused with disinterest. 
The Congress made a strategic political decision to exclude itself from the 
patriation debate in order to avoid an internal battle between its allies in the 
NDP and its affiliate, the Québec Federation of Labour. 
Résumé 
Cet article porte sur les débats intervenus au sein du mouvement ouvrier 
canadien au moment de la réforme constitutionnelle qui a eu lieu au début des 
années 80. En particulier, Vauteur soutient que les divisions politiques à 
l'intérieur du mouvement syndical et du Nouveau Parti démocratique (NPD) 
ont convaincu les dirigeants du Congrès du travail du Canada (CTC) de 
s'exclure du processus de rapatriement de la Constitution. Plusieurs 
universitaires ont soutenu que le CTC n 'était pas au courant des questions 
constitutionnelles ou s'en désintéressait. Cependant, selon des sources de 
premier plan, ces explications sont insuffisantes. Même s'il est exact de dire 
que le CTC n 'a pas participé activement au processus menant à la réforme 
constitutionnelle, il ne faut confondre inaction et désintérêt. Le Congrès a pris 
la décision politique stratégique de s'exclure du débat sur le rapatriement 
afin d'éviter une lutte interne entre ses alliés au NPD et sa filiale, la 
Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec. 
The 1980-81 Special Joint Committee on the Canadian Constitution heard 
submissions from over one thousand individuals and groups concerned 
about patriation and the proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Sheppard and Valpy 1982, 137). Women's organizations, civil liberties 
associations, Aboriginal organizations, ethno-cultural groups, and the 
business lobby all made their presence felt; the committee even heard from 
a group of British Columbians who wanted the right to use hallucinogenic 
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mushrooms entrenched in the Constitution (Sheppard and Valpy 1982, 
137). Surprisingly, the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC), the largest and 
most influential central labour body in Canada, chose not to make a formal 
oral presentation to the committee. 
Despite recent declines in union density, organized labour has remained 
an important social and political force in Canada. That said, it is impossible 
to speak of a pan-Canadian labour movement. Canada's regional character 
and linguistic duality have created one of the most substantial divisions 
within the labour movement. Indeed Canada is home to two distinct labour 
movements: one in English Canada and one in Québec. The vast majority of 
unions outside of Québec are affiliated to the confederally organized CLC. 
However, Québec unions have gravitated in different directions, affiliating 
themselves to a host of independent unions and a number of different labour 
centrals including the CLC-affiliated Québec Federation of Labour 
(FTQ),1 the Confédération des syndicats mtionaux(CSN)mdihe Centrale 
des syndicats du Québec (CSQ). The Québec labour movement is distinct 
because of its provincial focus, its collective identity and its shared history 
and language. The province's labour movement is also unique because of 
the multiple competitive trade union federations that exist in the province 
(Lipsig-Mummé 1995,209). 
The de facto existence of two distinct labour movements in Canada has 
meant that political struggles that have typified national politics are also in 
evidence in labour politics. At stake at both levels are issues of power, 
identity, and citizenship, which overlap and often conflict with one another. 
The fact that so many political conflicts resolve themselves into 
constitutional struggles stands as stark testimony to the abiding fractures in 
the Canadian polity. Constitutional discord is not something that plays out 
only among formal actors of the state system. The political dynamic that 
underlies Canada's constitutional travails, as well as the effects of official 
constitutional discourse, reverberate throughout civil society. The labour 
movement provides an example of the pervasiveness of this dynamic and 
discourse. Ralph GiintzePs PhD Dissertation, "In Quest of Emotional 
Gratification and Cognitive Consonance: Organized Labour and Québec 
SeparatistNationalism, 1960-1980" (Guntzel 1997) describes inrichdetail 
the evolving relationship between the CLC and the FTQ from the Quiet 
Revolution to the 1980 referendum, arguing that the Québec labour 
movement sought both greater autonomy and recognition from its 
counterpart in English Canada, gradually adopting a sovereigntist political 
outlook. 
This article begins where Gûntzel 's study left off by examining the 
period between the 1980 referendum on Québec sovereignty and the 
introduction of the Constitution Act in 1982 with a view to analyzing the 
CLC and FTQ positions on patriation of the Constitution. The article argues 
that the Congress adopted a neutral position on the Constitution in order to 
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avoid a confrontation with ihepéquiste FTQ who opposed patriation. The 
paper also argues that the CLC's non-involvement in the process of 
patriating the Constitution was influenced by its desire not to exacerbate the 
internal dissension that already existed within the social democratic New 
Democratic Party (NDP) over the issue. The second half of the article is 
devoted to critiquing previously held assumptions about organized 
labour's decision not to participate in the process of patriating the 
Constitution and proposes that the CLC's decision to adopt a neutral 
position represented a significant episode in the evolving relationship 
between the Congress and the FTQ. 
The Aftermath of the 1980 Referendum 
After the victory of the federalist forces in the 1980 Québec referendum on 
sovereignty-association, federal Justice Minister Jean Chrétien was 
dispatched to the provincial capitals to test the waters for a new round of 
constitutional reform. His efforts resulted in the establishment of the 
1980-81 Special Joint Committee on the Constitution. The committee's 
task was to gather public input regarding patriation of the Constitution with 
a proposed Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Before the committee began 
hearing submissions, the CLC did take the time to write a letter in support of 
Aboriginal rights (CLC 1980b), but that is as far as the Congress would go. 
In Québec, the FTQ, in a December 1980 memorandum to the provincial 
government wrote: 
Nous sommes en conséquence profondément indignés de la forme 
et contenu de la démarche de M. Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Nous 
regrettons d'ailleurs vivement qu'un parti social-démocrate 
comme le NPD s'enligne sur des positions centralisatrices et 
étroitement économistes cautionnant ainsi un procédé aussi 
antidémocratique que cette entreprise de repatriement unilatéral 
de la Constitution canadienne. (FTQ 1980,2) 
The Federation followed up in February 1981 with a detailed brief to the 
Québec government criticizing the content of Trudeau's proposed 
constitutional package. The FTQ argued that unilateral patriation of the 
Constitution was unnecessary, undemocratic, and part of a strategy to 
increase the power of Ontario and the federal government at the expense of 
Québec. The Federation also argued that the proposed Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms threatened the rights of workers and that the proposed 
amending formula was unacceptable because it did not give a veto to 
Québec (FTQ 1981). In terms of labour organizations in English Canada, 
only the BC Federation of Labour bothered to submit a written brief to the 
committee that addressed the immediate concerns of the union movement. 
Its brief complained about the exclusion of social and economic rights from 
the proposed Charter of Rights: 
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Nowhere does one find reference to a general right to employment, 
the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of 
work, the right to form trade unions, the right to social security, the 
right to protection of the family, the right to an adequate standard of 
living, the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard 
of physical and mental health, or a general right to education. It is 
our opinion that the failure of the Charter to make provision for 
this category of rights is its single most important shortcoming 
(BCFL 1981,10). 
Organized labour's absence from the Special Joint Committee's 
hearings was odd considering that Canadian unions had historically shown 
interest in the country's constitutional affairs. About a dozen labour 
organizations had participated in the Molgat-McGuigan Committee on 
constitutional reform that sat from 1970-1972. Local 444 of the United 
Auto Workers led the way by calling on the government to guarantee every 
Canadian the right to a job (UAW Local 444 1970,8). At the CLC's 1978 
convention, over a dozen labour organizations submitted resolutions on 
Canada's constitutional question. The FTQ, the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE), and the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL) all 
submitted resolutions in favour of the principle of self-determination for 
Québec, while the International Woodworkers of America submitted a 
resolution calling for national unity (CLC1978). Eleven resolutions calling 
for patriation of a new constitution or constitutional reform were submitted 
by various union locals representing the United Autoworkers union 
(UAW), the United Steel Workers of America (USWA), the Fishermen's 
Union, the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America 
(UE), the Canadian Brotherhood of Rail and Transport Workers (CBRT), 
and the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (CLC 
1978). In 1979, a large number of labour organizations in Canada were 
making their views known to the Task Force on Canadian unity. The 
Manitoba Federation of Labour, the Labour Council of Metropolitan 
Toronto, the USWA, the CSD, the Alberta Federation of Labour, and the 
Nova Scotia Federation of Labour, in their submissions to the Task Force, 
all stressed the economic dimension of constitutional instability. The 
Labour Council of Metropolitan Toronto, for example, argued that "the 
primary source of the present crisis... is the failure of successive federal 
governments to meet the economic, social and cultural needs of Canadians" 
(Canada 1979,186). It was therefore odd that organized labour in English 
Canada ignored Prime Minister Trudeau's assertion that patriation would 
result in a new constitution, a renewed federalism, and a new Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Such bold pronouncements ought to have signalled 
to organized labour that the constitutional talks of the early 1980s deserved 
unprecedented attention. 
Why then did Canadians witness such disinterest on behalf of organized 
labour in English Canada? The labour movement certainly did not "fall 
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asleep at the switch" as some observers have suggested (Union lawyers, as 
cited in Mandel 1994, 261). On the contrary, the CLC was certainly 
attentive to the tension between Québec and the Rest of Canada (ROC) over 
constitutional issues (as evidenced by the internal struggle within the 
Congress) and acutely aware that the Charter could potentially pose a 
serious threat to the union movement. At a September 1980 CLC Executive 
Council meeting, Pat Kerwin, head of the CLC Political Action department, 
reported that "the Charter of Rights may come up in the next few months 
which could inevitably threaten collective bargaining rights" (CLC 1980a). 
The Canadian labour movement's decision to stay away from the 
constitutional battles on Parliament Hill in the early 1980s, it will be argued, 
was entirely political and based on a strategy of self-preservation. In order 
to understand the reasons behind organized labour's policy of 
non-involvement, one must first reconsider the political relationship 
between the CLC, the FTQ, and the NDP. 
Although the CLC helped co-found the NDP in 1961, the Congress has 
never been able to deliver votes to the party in any significant way. Despite 
the CLC's million dollar campaign contributions, the federal NDP has 
never been considered a serious contender for office. That said, the party 
has definitely had a lasting influence in Canadian politics, as evidenced by 
its ability to push successfully for social reform, especially as the power 
broker in a minority parliament. 
Much of the NDP's electoral difficulties are owed to the party's dismal 
record in Québec. The sheer size and strength of the province of Québec 
unquestionably makes it a key component of the Canadian political system 
and the NDP is never likely to govern federally without the support of 
Quebec's working class. The province's influential trade union movement, 
which has identified itself with the nationalist cause since the late 1960s, 
has posed a serious problem for the NDP. Constitutional questions have 
always been the NDP's achilles heel in Québec (McLeod 1994,66). How do 
New Democrats balance a belief in strong central government and national 
social programs with the sovereigntist and devolutionary demands of 
Quebec's labour movement? The debate over patriation and the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms did not offer any new answers. 
It could certainly be argued that the advent of a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms provided organized labour's elected representatives in 
Parliament with an ideal opportunity to push for workers' rights as part of an 
overall constitutional package. After all it is widely accepted that the NDP 
was in a position to win certain concessions from the government in 
exchange for the party's support (Sheppard and Valpy 1982, 114). 
Unfortunately for those concerned about entrenching labour rights in the 
Constitution, union rights were not a priority for the federal NDP. Only 
NDP MP Svend Robinson took up labour's cause by moving a modest 
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amendment to section 2(d) of the Charter, which would have explicitly 
protected the right to bargain collectively. The amendment was defeated. 
It is important to note that constitutionally entrenched collective rights 
for workers were not of primary importance to any social democratic leader 
in Canada. After the new Constitution was proclaimed in 1982, British 
Columbia NDP leader Dave Barrett confessed, "The Constitution on a scale 
often was never more than one and a half to me. The whole debate was a 
gross waste of time" (Sheppard and Valpy 1982, 219). The Ontario and 
Alberta sections of the NDP both made long, detailed presentations to the 
Special Joint Committee on the Constitution that dealt with a myriad of 
different issues, but both neglected to mention the absence of specifically 
categorized labour rights in the Charter. Garth Stevenson, the Alberta 
NDP's constitutional advisor, explained that the party supported "the 
principle of entrenching human rights in the Constitution'' (Canada 1981, 
110). Stevenson went on to express the view that, 
Of course, we support very strongly, in addition to the ordinary 
catalogue of individual human rights, two particular categories of 
collective rights which, in effect, as Mr. Notley [Alberta NDP 
Leader] pointed out, are inherent in the whole course of our 
country's history, the right of our Aboriginal peoples and the equal 
rights of the two official languages right across Canada. We feel 
very strongly that those rights must be protected as well (Canada 
1981,110). 
Although the Alberta NDP opposed extending Charter rights to 
corporations, it was silent on the prospect of entrenching constitutional 
collective rights for labour. This oversight would have normally prompted 
organized labour to act, but instead, Canadian unions remained silent. 
In essence, the CLC's neutrality was triangulated between its political 
loyalties to the federal NDP, its close political connection to powerful 
provincial sections of the party, and the practical need to retain the 
allegiance of the FTQ. When Prime Minister Trudeau announced in 
October 1980 that his government was prepared to move forward with 
unilateral patriation of the Constitution without provincial consent, federal 
NDP leader Ed Broadbent gave his cautious approval, but demanded the 
inclusion of rights for women, the disabled, and Aboriginal peoples as a 
condition of his party's support (Steed 1989, 249). Content with the 
government's commitment to consider appropriate amendments, 
Broadbent enthusiastically endorsed Trudeau's plan to patriate the 
Constitution unilaterally. Although patriation of the Constitution was a 
longstanding policy of the NDP and its forerunner the CCF, Broadbent's 
lack of consultation within the party raised the ire of NDP provincial 
sections in Western Canada, where Trudeau was persona non grata. To 
complicate matters, Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney, the only NDP 
premier in Canada at the time, opposed entrenching a Charter of Rights in 
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the Constitution because he felt it would shift power away from 
democratically elected legislators to unaccountable, potentially 
right-wing, judges (Campbell 1984,31). The difference of opinion between 
Broadbent and Blakeney caused a major rift in the federal caucus and nearly 
ripped the NDP apart in the early 1980s (Steed 1989, 242). Alberta NDP 
leader Grant Notley sided with Blakeney arguing that provincial agreement 
was necessary in order for patriation to take place. The two Western NDP 
leaders were no doubt concerned about maintaining provincial control over 
resource revenues as well. From within Broadbent ' s own caucus, a group of 
four Saskatchewan MPs (Nystrom, de Jong, Anguish, and Hovdebo) 
publicly broke ranks with their leader and sided with Blakeney instead. 
Saskatchewan MP, Les Benjamin, who supported Broadbent, described the 
political tension as follows : "I was as popular as a skunk at a garden party in 
my own province. Close friends told me they'd never again put my sign on 
their lawn; they said I was a traitor to Saskatchewan. It was traumatic..." 
(Steed 1989,250). 
In Québec, Parti Québécois (PQ) Premier René Lévesque vigorously 
opposed the Charter and the patriated Constitution because of his belief 
that it did not recognize collective rights for Québec. Labour organizations 
in Québec, to varying degrees, were allied with the sovereigntist PQ. For its 
part, the FTQ had officially endorsed the PQ in the 1976 election and 
worked closely with Lévesque's government during its first term. The 
Québec government, along with the governments of Manitoba and 
Newfoundland, challenged the federal government's authority to proceed 
with unilateral patriation. Amid the legal deliberations on the constitution-
ality of unilateral patriation, Lévesque's position was eventually endorsed 
by the opposition Québec Liberals, who joined the PQ in condemning 
unilateral patriation of the Constitution (Denis et Denis 1992, 131). The 
Québec government's position was also endorsed by the FTQ, the CSN, and 
the Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec (CEQ). The Québec labour 
movement's opposition to the patriation process was so intense that the 
trade union centrals actually toyed with the idea of appealing to the British 
Trade Union Congress for support in preventing a new constitution from 
being adopted in London. The FTQ did eventually join a group known as 
Solidarité-Québec, which gathered 700,000 signatures on a petition calling 
on Queen Elizabeth II to protect Québec from unilateral patriation of the 
Constitution (Denis et Denis 1992,131). 
Caught in the middle of this constitutional struggle was the CLC. The 
Congress did not adopt any sort of position on the Charter. According to 
CLC Executive Council minutes dated September 5, 1980, "President 
McDermott explained that he was of the view that we should not get 
involved in the 'circus' now completed, especially because the nature of our 
organization would not lend itself to us having a consensus even within our 
Council" (CLC 1980a). After a brief discussion, it was generally agreed 
that the Congress should "stay out of the issue of the Constitutional Talks as 
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much as possible at this time" (CLC 1980a). These two statements are 
important because they shed light on the CLC's structure, which weakens 
the cohesiveness of the Congress based on internal cleavages relating to 
region and language. 
Specifically in terms of patriation, the CLC was worried by the fact that 
the NDP was internally divided over the issue and that patriation was 
threatening to hurt the party electorally. It is also clear that the Congress 
understood that organized labour in Québec was very much opposed to 
Trudeau's package of constitutional reform. The FTQ's growing strength 
within the CLC, as evidenced by the special powers2 it was granted as a 
provincial affiliate in 1974, guaranteed that the Federation's position could 
not be ignored. Furthermore, the CLC president was in an awkward 
political position personally given his unpopularity in Québec at the time. 
McDermott's failure to back the Canadian Union of Postal Workers 
(CUPW) President Jean-Claude Parrot when he encouraged his members to 
defy a federal back-to-work order during the 1978 postal strike enraged 
rank-and-file union activists, especially in Québec. Prior to being 
confronted with the issue of patriation of the Constitution, McDermott had 
barely survived a spring CLC convention in 1980 where the FTQ, Québec 
locals of CUPE, and the CUPW roundly condemned McDermott for the 
Parrot incident. These same unions mused openly about finding a 
replacement for McDermott as CLC president (Canadian Press 1980,4). 
Since Broadbent, Blakeney, and the FTQ were adamant about their 
respective constitutional positions, McDermott decided to duck the issue 
entirely with the help of his friend,3 FTQ President Louis Laberge, who was 
able to successfully pressure CLC executive members to stay away 
completely from constitutional affairs. 
Analysis of CLC minutes confirms that the Congress was forced to make 
a very important strategic decision over patriation and the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. The CLC had several options, but the most practical 
intervention would have been to demand that the federal NDP make the 
collective rights of workers a condition of support for constitutional 
patriation. This option would have unquestionably created a bitter conflict 
between the FTQ, the CLC, and the NDP. The FTQ would have been 
angered by the fact that the CLC had entered into the Charter debate, thus 
lending credibility to the patriation process. Moreover, the NDP would 
potentially have been troubled by the CLC's insistence on creating a new 
condition for the party's support of Trudeau's constitutional package. A 
public split between the NDP, the CLC, and the FTQ was certainly not in the 
interest of the Canadian labour movement. 
The CLC's September 1980 decision to stay out of the constitutional 
debate did encounter some internal opposition. At the December 1980 
Executive Council meeting, Alberta Federation of Labour President Harry 
Kostiuk appealed "for support in making representation to the federal 
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government on the question of the patriated Constitution and the 
entrenchment of the workers' rights in that Constitution" (CLC 1980b). 
Kostiuk was immediately supported by British Columbia Federation of 
Labour President Jim Kinnaird and Dick Martin, President of the Manitoba 
Federation of Labour: "It was expressed by Brother Martin that in Western 
Canada there is tremendous pressure being applied by the affiliates to say 
something about workers' rights, and he would rather see the Congress say 
something as a body, by reversing the decision made at the last meeting" 
(CLC 1980b). 
McDermott clearly did not want to reopen the issue: "If Brother Laberge 
were here he would be speaking very strongly in disagreement of voicing 
our opinion" (CLC 1980b). The CLC president was supported by his 
colleague Bob White, "who felt we have no choice at this time but to 
reaffirm our position or we will be opening serious wounds we thought had 
been solved long ago" (CLC 1980b). McDermott's view prevailed and the 
original position of the September 1980 meeting was upheld. 
In early 1981, the highest courts in Québec and Manitoba upheld the 
position of the federal government. However, Newfoundland's Court of 
Appeal ruled that unilateral patriation of the Constitution would constitute a 
violation of constitutional convention. These contradictory rulings 
prompted the prime minister to refer the matter to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. 
While the Supreme Court deliberated, the internal battle within the NDP 
raged on. In an effort to bring both sides of the party back together, David 
Lewis and Tommy Douglas met with Blakeney and Broadbent and senior 
NDP staffers in Hull, Québec shortly before Lewis' death in May 1981. The 
meeting was a dismal failure. NDP federal secretary, Robin Sears, 
described the meeting as "the most personal, vituperative, unpleasant, 
unnerving, disillusioning, disheartening, experience I have ever endured in 
my political life" (Smith 1992, 220). Douglas and Lewis, who sided with 
Broadbent, were worried that the dispute over patriation would cause 
irreparable harm to the party. 
The same fears existed in the CLC. One senior CLC official admitted to 
Judy Steed of the Globe and Mail that "many labour staffers were against 
Ed" (Steed 1989,253). The unidentified high-ranking union official went 
on to say that: 
Trudeau gave nothing on collective rights, which are political 
rights and should be dealt with in Parliament by elected people, not 
appointed judges—but under Trudeau's package, power was 
being shifted to the courts, there was nothing about the right to a 
job... So there was more off-the-record support for Blakeney's 
position in the executive council of the CLC. But the CLC didn't 
want to start a public war with Ed (Steed 1989, 253). 
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However, internal dissent within the CLC continued to mount. 
McDermott and Blakeney met in March 1981. According to Robert 
Sheppard and Michael Valpy, "the strongest message [Blakeney] received 
from Dennis McDermott was that the CLC president wished the 
Constitution issue would go away so that the politicians could talk about 
unemployment, inflation, and patriation—as he put it—of the economy" 
(1982, 132). McDermott opened the March 9, 1981 CLC Executive. 
Committee meeting by expressing his concern over "the continued 
harassment of Ed Broadbent by the Saskatchewan people with respect to 
the Constitution" (CLC 1981a). The CLC president's message was clear: 
"Quit attacking the federal Party; they made a political deal and they cannot 
now walk away from it" (CLC 1981a). Later that month, at the CLC 
Executive Council meeting, Nadine Hunt of the Saskatchewan Federation 
of Labour (SFL) further frustrated McDermott by urging the CLC to adopt a 
similar resolution on the Constitution to the one adopted previously by the 
SFL executive. The resolution stated: 
That the SFL, with respect to the Constitution, campaign for the 
following: 
a) Abolition of the Senate or at least abolishing their veto power 
b) Amending formula which recognizes population and regional 
areas of Canada 
c) The Charter of Rights does not infringe on trade union rights such 
as compulsory membership in legitimate trade unions, 
compulsory check-off, and the right of workers to organize into 
the union of their choice. 
d) On other rights, the Constitution should provide an override 
clause which would give elected legislators, federal or provincial, 
the ultimate authority to amend/or implement legislation (CLC 
1981b). 
It is interesting to note that three of the SFL's four proposals were 
eventually adopted by the federal government. Nevertheless, the CLC 
president rejected Hunt's resolution by stating that the CLC Council had 
previously agreed to take a neutral position. The CLC president went on to 
express his disappointment over the fact that the SFL wanted to enter into 
the constitutional debate. McDermott "appealed to Sister Hunt to exercise 
restraint" (CLC 1981b). Hunt's retort that the CLC was "doing a disservice 
to the workers of this country" (CLC 1981b) did not sway the head of the 
CLC. The minutes report that "President McDermott said that whether our 
remaining quiet turns out to be right or wrong, it was a decision made by this 
Council" (CLC 1981b). In the end, delegates to the NDP's 1981 policy 
convention voted roughly 2-1 in favour of Broadbent's position. 
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In September 1981, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in split decisions 
that although the federal government did have the authority to patriate the 
Constitution unilaterally, in doing so, it would be violating a constitutional 
convention requiring substantive provincial consent. The Supreme Court's 
decision in the Patriation Reference prompted a new round of 
constitutional consultation between Ottawa and the provinces. In 
November 1981, the federal government succeeded in gaining the support 
it needed from the provinces, but excluded Québec. During the "Night of 
the Long Knives," Chrétien and the nine premiers from English Canada 
hammered out a final agreement while Lévesque was sleeping. The 
agreement included a notwithstanding clause to allay the worries of people 
like Allan Blakeney who feared judicial supremacy under the new Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms. Upon learning that the other premiers had accepted 
Trudeau's patriation scheme, Lévesque claimed that Québec would neither 
sign, nor recognize the new Constitution. 
Disorganized Labour: Alternate Explanations 
Left-leaning critics of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms have taken 
numerous different perspectives on the issue of organized labour and 
patriation of the Constitution. Michael Mandel has argued that labour's 
non-involvement in the patriation process stemmed from its belief that the 
Charter was of no consequence to Canadian unions (Mandel 1994, 
259-62). Mandel's conclusion is partially supported by comments made by 
legal scholar Joseph Weiler. Weiler contends that: 
The union movement's refusal to attend the Special Committee 
hearings was not intended to be seen as a boycott or protest against 
the process of constitutional reform or the entrenchment of human 
rights in the Canadian Constitution. Rather, the leadership of the 
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) decided that the unemployment 
rate at the time was so high that the unions could not use their 
limited resources to appear in front of another panel of politicians 
who were talking about the arcane issues of constitutional reform 
and human rights (1986,213). 
Weiler's analysis, which was presented in 1985, is an excellent 
representation of the CLC spin that emerged after legal scholars first began 
hinting that organized labour had "missed the boat" or "fallen asleep at the 
switch" when it came to the Charter. 
Although Weiler's analysis omitted important information (he fails to 
address the tension between the FTQ and the CLC or the internal dissent 
that existed within the NDP), it did superficially reflect the labour 
movement's desire to see the government deal with concrete economic 
problems rather than abstract constitutional issues. However, his analysis 
does not come close to a full explanation of the CLC's motives. The CLC's 
decision not to participate in the process of patriating the Constitution was 
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significant for several reasons. Most importantly, the Congress allowed its 
preference for a strong centralized federal state to be overshadowed by the 
FTQ's opposition to patriation. In other words, the tables had turned in the 
relationship between the CLC and the FTQ. For the first time, a provincial 
federation of labour was giving marching orders to the CLC. The CLC's 
self-imposed censorship on the issue of patriation and the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms left it out of step with its allies in the social movements and 
arguably did a disservice to the Canadian labour movement outside of 
Québec. 
Admittedly, some members of the Congress were genuinely more 
concerned with inflation and unemployment than they were about the 
constitutional struggle on Parliament Hill. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that the CLC executive so easily acquiesced to Laberge and the 
FTQ. Labour leaders from English Canada figured that the stakes were not 
high enough to merit a severe sovereigntist headache. In general, dissident 
unions and provincial federations of labour (with the exception of British 
Columbia) lined up behind the CLC's position as an act of solidarity. 
On April 17, 1982, Queen Elizabeth II proclaimed Canada's new 
Constitution Act. A few months later, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled 
that Québec did not have a veto over constitutional amendments. In the 
aftermath of the Supreme Court decision, the FTQ, the CSN, and the CEQ 
joined the Société Saint Jean-Baptiste and released a joint statement 
asserting "cette Constitution... n'est pas, ne peu pas être etne serajamais la 
nôtre" (1982). 
Conclusion 
This article has focused on the CLC's experience with constitutional reform 
in the early 1980s. The first half of the article was devoted to explaining why 
the Canadian Labour Congress excluded itself from the process of 
patriating the Constitution. Primary sources strongly suggest that the both 
the CLC and the NDP were internally divided over the issue of patriation. 
Whereas CLC executive members argued over strategy and how best to 
deal with party union relations, the NDP was internally divided over both 
the substance and the process of constitutional reform. The Saskatchewan 
NDP, in particular, argued that the unilateral patriation of the Constitution 
with a Charter of Rights and Freedoms violatedprovincial rights and would 
give too much power to unelected and unaccountable judges. On the other 
side, federal NDP leader Ed Broadbent and the party's establishment 
argued that support for patriation of the Constitution was a long-standing 
party policy and that the Charter of Rights would protect the interests of 
minorities. In the end, Broadbent's position prevailed and Premier 
Blakeney eventually agreed to a modified patriation scheme. The CLC's 
position on patriation was shaped by its allies in both the NDP and FTQ. In 
the eyes of many English Canadian labour leaders, the FTQ's strong 
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opposition to Trudeau's constitutional vision was offset by NDP leader Ed 
Broadbent's enthusiastic support for a strong Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. Reluctant to offend its political allies in either camp, the CLC 
officially decided to remain a neutral observer as the debate over patriation 
and the Charter unfolded. 
The second part of this article was devoted to critiquing alternate 
explanations for the CLC's silence on patriation. Several scholars have 
argued that the CLC was either unaware or genuinely disinterested in 
constitutional issues and therefore did not play an important role in the 
patriation debate. However, primary sources strongly indicate that these 
explanations are simply insufficient. Although it is accurate to suggest that 
the CLC was not an active participant in the process of constitutional 
reform, inactivity should not be confused with disinterest. The Congress 
made a strategic political decision to exclude itself from the patriation 
debate to avoid an internal battle between its political allies in the NDP and 
its labour allies in the FTQ. 
Patriation of the Constitution with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
in many ways, represented the triumph of liberalism in Canada. As Reg 
Whitaker has correctly noted, "that the Charter should reflect an image of 
liberal rather than social democracy is not particularly surprising given the 
structure of Canadian society, and the philosophical make-up of the 
governing party" (Whitaker 1992, 223). Of course, Whitaker recognized 
that the role of the Left had traditionally been to challenge the limits of 
liberal democracy. However, in assessing the NDP and CLC approaches to 
patriation, he has correctly noted that, even among left-wing activists, 
"democracy in Canada seems well defined by liberal limits" (Whitaker 
1992,224). The NDP's limited approach to the patriation debate, evidenced 
by its failure to argue the merits of, let alone demand, the inclusion of social 
and labour rights into the new Constitution, demonstrated the party's own 
political limitations. 
For its part, the CLC's hands-off approach to patriation, in many ways, 
vindicated the NDP's weak position on constitutional reform. By refusing 
to apply any sort of pressure on the NDP to make labour rights a condition of 
the party's support for constitutional patriation, the CLC arguably 
abdicated its responsibility as an organization representing the interests of 
workers. Rather than participate in the constitutional debate, the CLC 
simply wanted it to disappear. Although the Constitution was patriated with 
a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, Quebec's exclusion from the 
new Constitution ensured that Canada's constitutional question had not yet 
been answered. For organized labour, the adoption of a new Constitution 
represented one more episode in the divergent relationship between the 
CLC and the FTQ, ushering in a decade of constitutional paralysis in the 
Congress. 
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Notes 
1. In 1993, the CLC and FTQ attempted to transcend their own constitutional crisis 
by developing a sovereignty-association partnership agreement that essentially 
gave the Federation the status of an autonomous union in Québec, while 
maintaining its membership in the CLC. 
2. At the CLC's 1974 convention, the FTQ won jurisdiction over union education 
and organizing in Québec, jurisdiction over local and regional labour councils, 
and the transfer of both human and financial resources from the CLC to the FTQ 
equal to the amount that Québec trade unionists contributed to the CLC. 
3. Laberge and McDermott had known each other since 1964 when Laberge was 
hired as the UAW's organizing director for Québec. 
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